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Abstract- With the growth of information technology (IT) systems, network security is rapidly becoming a 
critical business concern. Due to the interconnectivity of IT systems, a comprehensive description of all of 
the key elements and relationships that make up an organization’s network security is needed, which can 
be referred as network security architecture. The value of this architecture is often questioned by 
organizations in terms of its practical application. This paper has presents a new approach to the network 
security architecture by using the Zachman Framework capabilities. The network security architecture of 
nuclear and academic facilities academic centers is discussed to show how a conceptual model can be 
applied to a real organization. This new approach makes any Local Area Network LAN more secure and 
more flexible than any conventional security procedures without affecting the performance of the LAN. 
Applying Zachman matrix provides the answers to what data assets the nuclear and research facilities 
controls, how they are used, and where they are located.      
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Abstract- With the growth of information technology (IT) 
systems, network security is rapidly becoming a critical 
business concern. Due to the interconnectivity of IT systems, a 
comprehensive description of all of the key elements and 
relationships that make up an organization’s network security 
is needed, which can be referred as network security 
architecture. The value of this architecture is often questioned 
by organizations in terms of its practical application. This 
paper has presents a new approach to the network security 
architecture by using the Zachman Framework capabilities. 
The network security architecture of nuclear and academic 
facilities academic centers is discussed to show how a 
conceptual model can be applied to a real organization. This 
new approach makes any Local Area Network LAN more 
secure and more flexible than any conventional security 
procedures without affecting the performance of the LAN. 
Applying Zachman matrix provides the answers to what data 
assets the nuclear and research facilities controls, how they 
are used, and where they are located. 
Keywords: computer network, LAN’s security, zachaman, 
information technology (IT), Information systems 
architecture (ISA). 
I. Introduction 
he industry is moving toward more formal 
development and documentation of enterprise 
architectures based on Enterprise Architecture 
Frameworks. The term “architecture” has been used for 
many years within the information technology (IT) 
community to refer to various types of overviews that 
provide guidance to software systems and applications 
developers. The term is obviously a metaphor derived 
from the building trade [1, 8]. Like a homeowner which 
is designing a home. Information technology managers 
work with an architect to provide an agreed upon 
architectural drawing of the enterprise’s information 
systems and processes. This high-level 
Architectural drawing does not change with 
tactical decisions to deploy improved technology since 
it is simply built around a framework of business 
processes and the information that they need [2]. 
Today, there is a growing movement among 
both business managers and IT managers to use the 
term “enterprise architecture” to refer to a 
comprehensive description of all of the key elements 
and relationships that make up an organization. Based 
on  this,  enterprise  information  architecture  provides a 
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framework for reducing information system complexity 
and enabling enterprise information sharing. Since most 
enterprises have existing information systems, the 
architectural drawing provides the future state and 
facilitates the best possible strategy to remodel with the 
least amount of inconvenience to the business [1]. 
The rapidly growing interconnectivity of IT 
systems, and the convergence of their technology, 
renders these systems increasingly vulnerable to 
malicious attacks. Network attacks cause organizations 
several hours or days of downtime and serious 
breaches in data confidentiality and integrity. Depending 
on the level of the attack and the type of information that 
has been compromised, the consequences of network 
attacks vary in degree from mildly annoying to 
completely debilitating, and the cost of recovery from 
attacks can range from hundreds to millions of       
dollars [3]. 
This paper presents a network security 
architecture based on the Zachman Framework. The 
aim of this architecture is to organize the data, process, 
and technology around the points of view taken by 
various players instead of representing them as entirely 
separate entities. For this, we’ll consider the Zachman 
Framework in more detail in Section 2. In Section 3, the 
relation between network security and the Zachman 
Framework is discussed. An example for designing 
security architecture of Nuclear and Research facilities 
based on the Zachman Framework is presented in      
this work. 
II. The Zachman Framework 
The Zachman Framework for Information 
Systems Architecture (ISA), defined in 1987, is a logical 
construct to define and control the interfaces and 
integration of all components of a system. The 
framework of the Zachman model enables systematic 
capture of system specific information from the various 
perspectives with respect to system architecture [4]. 
Table 1 illustrates the Zachman model, tailored to 
support a network security system. 
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Table 1: The Zachman Framework 
 
In this customization of the model, the system 
developers have an existing operational system in place. 
The rows at the top are the most abstract and are 
oriented toward very broad goals and plans. If we were 
building a house, this layer would describe the 
diagrams, pictures, and plans the architect would 
discuss with the owner. The next level is more specific, 
but still abstract. These are the diagrams that the 
architect would discuss with the contractor. In a similar 
way, the top level of the Zachman Framework, labeled 
“Scope,” is focused on the concerns of senior 
executives. The second is focused on the slightly more 
detailed concerns of business managers. A lower level 
focuses on concerns that business and IS manager’s 
work together on, and then, finally, on a detail that IS 
managers and developers work on [1]. The columns in 
the Zachman framework represent different areas of 
interest for each perspective. The columns describe the 
dimensions of the systems development effort. The 
Zachman Framework has two very distinctive features 
that make it ideal for information modeling. The 
framework may be applied at any level of abstraction in 
the system development process, from a global 
enterprise, to a system, subsystem, or major module 
level. The framework also gives the modeler latitude in 
that any data representation technique can be used to 
model the inner workings of each cell. The system 
model becomes more implementation specific. 
However, the requirements traceability between layers 
can be maintained through backward references to 
upper layers of cells. This traceability is critical in 
security requirements engineering, where tracing a 
global access control requirement may translate into 
explicit setting of access controls on specific files or 
directories within an operating system. The framework 
provides taxonomy: that helps us understand the 
perspectives of various players in the development of an 
information system and the descriptions of the system 
that can be produced during its creation [4]. 
The model is frequently used as a framework 
during information systems activities to support the 
solicitation, identification and mapping of the following 
information re-engineering associated with an 
information system’s[4] such as goals, objectives, 
environment, customers served, time constraints, 
functional description, information architecture, 
supporting infrastructure. In short, the Zachman ISA can 
provide a consolidated view of a system, to whatever 
level of detail a modeler chooses. 
III. Network Security and The Zachman 
Framework 
The objective of network security architecture is 
to provide the conceptual design of the network security 
infrastructure, related security mechanisms, and related 
security policies and procedures. The security 
architecture links the components of the security 
infrastructure as one cohesive unit. The goal of this 
cohesive unit is to protect corporate information [3]. The 
security architecture should be developed by both the 
network design and the IT security teams. It is typically 
integrated into the existing enterprise network and is 
dependent on the IT services that are offered through 
the net-work infrastructure. The access and security 
requirements of each IT service should be defined 
before the network is divided into modules with clearly 
identified trust levels. Each module can be treated 
separately and assigned a different security model. The 
goal is to have layers of security so that a “successful” 
intruder’s access is constrained to a limited part of the 
network. Just as the bulkhead design in a ship can 
contain a leak so that the entire ship does not sink, the 
layered security design limits the damage a security 
breach has on the health of the entire network. In 
addition, the architecture should define common 
security services to be implemented across the    
network [7]. 
For security architecture modeling purposes, 
the first three levels of the perspective hierarchy 
(planner, owner, and designer) and the Network cell of 
the Builder’s view are useful. They provide the consumer 
perspective of the system’s end user, the perspective of 
the system “owner” or contracting entity, and the 
perspective of the designer, or systems engineer. In 
other words, the “as built” and used in daily operation 
perspective, the “as desired” operation perspective, and 
“as actually specified” perspective. The highest level, 
the Planner View, defines a clear and coordinated 
boundary (domain) of the system for the purposes of 
identifying the people, subsystems, and needs 
impacted by the system. The Owner’s View captures the 
business and organizational relationships, and their 
external interfaces. It also documents sources of system 
requirements, including those derived from legacy 
systems. The Designer’s View establishes and 
documents the security architectural design and 
provides a basis for system measurement. Finally, the 
Builder’s View provides a detailed description of the 
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design and methodology for monitoring and correcting 
system performance [2]. 
Similarly, the first three columns of the Zachman 
matrix (data, function, and network) provide the answers 
to what data assets the organization controls, how they 
are used and where they are located [5]. As shown in 
Table 1, these are: 
Data: Each of the rows in this column address 
understanding of and dealing with an enterprise’s data. 
This begins in Row One with a list of the security 
concerns of the enterprise and its directions and 
purposes. Row Two is a contiguous model of the 
security problems seen by the participants in the 
business. Also, relationships may be shown which 
themselves have attributes. Row Three provides more of 
an information based perspective of the network 
security, resolving the rules and relationships, along with 
relationships containing their own attributes. Indeed, 
attributes are more exhaustively defined and unique 
identifiers are specified. 
Function: The rows in the function column describe the 
process of translating the mission of the network 
security system of the enterprise into successively more 
detailed definitions of its operations. Where Row One is 
a list of the kinds of network security related activities 
the enterprise conducts, Row Two describes these 
activities in a contiguous model. Row Three portrays 
them in terms of data transforming processes, 
described exclusively in terms of the conversion of input 
data into output data. 
Network: This column is concerned with the 
geographical distribution of the enterprise’s activities. At 
the strategic level (Row One), this is simply a listing of 
the places where the enterprise does business. At Row 
Two, this becomes a more detailed communications 
chart, describing how the various locations interact with 
each other. Row Three produces the network 
architecture for data distribution, itemizing the special 
security policy for the enterprise. In Row Four, this 
distribution is translated into the kinds of computer and 
network facilities that are required in each location to 
force the security policy. 
IV. The Network Security of Nuclear 
and Academic Facilities 
Nuclear and Research facilities, as major users 
of information and communication technology 
(especially Internet), also need security; however, 
because of their special structure and requirements, the 
traditional solutions and policies to limit access to the 
Internet are not effective for them. These institutions face 
concerns about the security of computing resources 
and information. The security problems in these 
environments are divided into two categories [3, 6]: 
problems with research information and problems with 
administrative information. Although the corporate and 
research environments face common security problems 
they can’t choose similar methods to solve them, 
because of their different structures. In a corporate 
environment, the natural place to draw a security 
perimeter is around the corporation itself. However, in a 
nuclear and research facilities research environment, it 
is very difficult to draw a perimeter surrounding all of the 
people who need to access information resources and 
only those people. This is mainly because of different 
types of information resources in these environments 
and also different users who want to access them. So if 
the security perimeter chosen is too big it includes 
untrusted people and if it is chosen too small it excludes 
some of the authorized people. 
In addition, corporations can put serious 
limitations on the Internet connectivity in the name of 
security but research organizations simply cannot 
function under such limitations. First, trusted users need 
unrestricted and transparent access to Internet 
resources (including World Wide Web (WWW), FTP, 
Gopher, and electronic mail) located outside the 
security perimeter. Researchers rely on fingertip access 
to online library catalogs and bibliographies, preprints of 
papers, and other network resources supporting 
collaborative work. Second, trusted users need the 
unrestricted ability to publish and disseminate 
information to people outside the security perimeter via 
anonymous FTP, or WWW. This dissemination of 
research results and papers is critical to the research 
community. Third, the security perimeter must allow 
access to protected resources from trusted users 
located outside the security perimeter. An increasing 
number of users work at home or while traveling. 
Research collaborators may also need to enter the 
security perimeter from remote hosts. If we consider 
these centers as an enterprise, the security architecture 
of their network can be designed based on the 
ZachmanFramework. For the first four rows and first 
three columns of the framework the cells can be 
completed as described in the following sections: 
a) Planner’s View 
An overall organizational policy would be 
implemented in the Planner’s View. The first cell is the 
list of things important to the Nuclear and Research 
facilities. Research groups often need to maintain the 
privacy of their work, ideas for future research, or results 
of research in progress. Administrative organizations 
need to prevent leakage of student grades, personal 
contact information, and faculty and staff personnel 
records. Moreover, the cost of security compromises is 
high. A research group could lose its competitive edge, 
and administrative organizations could face legal 
proceedings for unauthorized information release. On 
the other hand, nuclear and research facilities and 
research institutions are ideal environments for hackers 
An Approach to a New Network Security Architecture of Nuclear and Research Facilities
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and intruders and many of them are physically located 
in these places and they are highly motivated to access 
and modify grades and other information. There are 
several reports of break-ins and deletion of data from 
educational institutions [3, 6]. 
The second cell in this row is the list of the 
processes important to the enterprise. This can also be 
divided into two categories: processes done by nuclear 
facilities, such as radiation monitoring and control; and 
research processes, such as conducting projects and 
disseminating information. The next cell (the network 
cell) is the locations of the entire research and nuclear 
facilities. 
b) Owner’s View 
The next level down, the Owner’s View, 
considers the groupings of data and means of access 
available to both internal and external users. For the first 
cell (data), we can see three categories of information in 
a university: 
1. The information officially disseminated by the 
nuclear facilities (such as news and events articles). 
2. The information gathered and used by network 
users. 
3. The information not allowed to be publicly 
disseminated. 
Based on the above categories, three types of 
function servers (second cell) may be proposed in the 
research facilities which are supervised by nuclear 
facilities: 
1.
 
Public servers, which are used to support 
information dissemination.
 
2.
 
Experimental servers, which are used for 
researchers to develop and test their own software 
packages and protocols.
 
3.
 
Trusted servers, which are used for administrative 
purposes or keeping confidential information. These 
servers are the places where functions occur with 
respect to the data [9].
 
The other requirement of a nuclear facilities 
environment is to let its trusted members access the 
resources of the network from outside of the security 
perimeter (e.g., from home or on trips). Another problem 
that causes serious trouble for the university is network 
viruses. These viruses are distributed through the 
network when users are accessing special sites. Proxy 
servers can be used to control this problem. Of course 
these proxy servers should be transparent. The network 
cell of the framework in this layer is shown in Figure 2.
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Network layer in Owner’s View 
c) Designer’s View 
At the next level, the Designer’s View, we 
introduce mechanisms to protect the network. To 
achieve the goals described in owner’s view, the logical 
data model (first cell) of the proposed network security 
policy was designed based on seven basic rules: 
1. Packets to or from the public servers are 
unrestricted if they are from authorized ports. The 
authorized port is the port that the special service is 
on. Of course, each public server should be 
protected itself. The server level security means to 
enforce stronger access controls on that level. 
2. Packets to or from the experimental servers are 
unrestricted. These servers can be located outside 
of the security perimeter. 
3. Packets to or from the authorized ports of trusted 
servers are allowed only from or to the authorized 
clients inside the security perimeter. 
4. All of the outgoing packets are allowed to travel 
outside after port address translation. The incoming 
packets are allowed if they can be determined to be 
responses to outbound requests. 
5. The packets to or from trusted users of hosts 
outside the security perimeter are allowed. 
6. All of the requests from particular applications such 
as http should be passed through a proxy server. 
7. All the packets to or from outside the security 
perimeter should be passed through the Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS). 
Rule 1 is based on our need to support information 
dissemination in a research environment. Public servers 
must be separated from trusted hosts and protect them 
at the server level. Because of they may be 
compromised, so it should make a plan to recover them 
from information kept securely behind the security 
perimeter. 
Rule 2 follows from recognition that researchers 
sometimes need to develop and test insecure software 
packages and protocols on the Internet. Of course they 
should be alerted that their server is not secure and their 
information may be corrupted. 
An Approach to a New Network Security Architecture of Nuclear and Research Facilities
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Rule 3 is based on the fact that conﬁdential information 
must be protected. These servers are most important 
resources to be protected and therefore they should be 
put in a special secure zone. 
Rule 4 follows from recognition that open network 
access is a necessary component of a research 
environment. On the other hand it is not allowed to any 
user to set up Internet servers without permission. The 
address translation prevents outside systems from 
accessing internal resources except those listed as 
public servers. 
Rule 5 grants access to protected resources to users as 
they work from home or while traveling, as well as to 
collaborators located outside the research group. 
Rule 6 is based on the need to block some Internet sites 
that contain viruses. 
Rule 7 follows from recognition that the above rules 
should be monitored somehow. IDS can be a proper 
tool to monitor the network and check if there is any 
violation of proposed rules. The network cell is shown     
in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Network layer in Designer’s View 
d) Builder’s View 
Finally, the Builder’s View describes how 
technology may be used to address the information 
processing needs identified in the previous rows. For 
network security purposes, mainly the network cell is 
needed. Generally, two ways can be proposed to 
implement the designed network: first, to use hardware 
firewalls and caches; and second, to use general 
purpose servers with proper software packages as 
cache, proxy, and firewall. In our case study in the 
nuclear facilities the proxy and cache is used as 
transparent server, and IPTABLES as the firewall for 
packet filtering, in which the different zones of the 
network were defined. Also Network Address is used as 
Translation of the IPTABLES for implementing the rules 
in design view. Of course each server in the network had 
also its own security rules and guards. For restricting 
access to special websites (mainly to avoid viruses) 
special software was utilized. SNORT is used as as IDS. 
The network cell is shown in Figure 3. 
 
V.
 
Conclusion
 
Security architecture for computer network 
makes any Local Area Network LAN more secure and 
more flexible than any conventional security procedures 
without affecting the performance of the LAN. Creating 
Security architecture for nuclear and research facilities, it 
is possible to develop descriptive security architecture. It 
provides the “as built” and used in daily operation 
perspective, the “as desired” operation perspective, and 
“as actually specified” perspective. Similarly, Creating 
security architecture for nuclear and research facilities 
by the Zachman matrix (data, function, and network) 
provide the answers to what data assets the 
organization controls, how they are used, and where 
they are located. Nuclear facilities, as one of the major 
users of information and communication technology, 
present a good case study for applying the proposed 
architecture. The key point of the research is to design 
the network security architecture of these facilities based 
on a framework so it provides the consumer perspective 
of the system’s end user, the perspective of the system 
“owner” or contracting entity, and the perspective of the 
designer or systems engineer simultaneously.
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